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Abstract—Marketplaces specializing in malicious hacking
products - including malware and exploits - have recently become
more prominent on the darkweb and deepweb. We scrape 17
such sites and collect information about such products in a
unified database schema. Using a combination of manual labeling
and unsupervised clustering, we examine a corpus of products
in order to understand their various categories and how they
become specialized with respect to vendor and marketplace. This
initial study presents how we effectively employed unsupervised
techniques to this data as well as the types of insights we gained
on various categories of malicious hacking products.
I. INTRODUCTION
Websites on the deepweb and darkweb specializing in
the sale of malicious hacking products - such as malware
platforms, software exploits and botnet rental - have become
the venue of choice for online purchase of these items by cyber
criminals. In this paper, we leverage unsupervised learning
to categorize and study the product offerings of 17 of these
online markets. Specifically, we describe how we used man-
ual labeling combined with clustering techniques to identify
product categories (Section II), and then we analyze the results
both quantitatively and qualitatively (Section III). We identify
categories of products that are highly specialized with respect
to particular vendors and markets. We also highlight other
interesting facets of this ecosystem - for instance, vendors
who habitually cross-list products on multiple sites and nearly
identical products for sale by multiple vendors.
Background and Related Work. The darkweb refers to the
anonymous communication provided by crypto-network tools
such as ”The Onion Router” (Tor), which is free software
dedicated to protect the privacy of its users by obscuring traffic
analysis as a form of network surveillance [1]. On the other
hand, the deepweb refers to sites not indexed by common
search engines due to a variety of reasons (e.g. password
protections), that not necessarily rely on additional protocols.
The sites on the darkweb and deepweb explored in this
study comprise marketplaces [2]. In these websites, vendors
advertise and sell their goods and services relating to malicious
hacking, drugs, pornography, weapons and software services.
Products are most often verified before any funds are released
to the seller. The main engine of these environments is trust.
If a seller is misleading or fails to deliver the appropriate item,
he is banned from the site. Similarly, buyers can be banned
for not complying with the transaction rules. Basically, all
marketplaces in darkweb require a registration and a valid
account to get access. Sometimes, this registration process is
not trivial, including effort to answer questions, solve puzzles,
mathematical equation or CAPTCHA.
Most related work on darkweb markets such as [3] focus
on a single market and do not restrict their study to malicious
hacking products. Our previous work on markets [4] focused
on a game theoretic analysis of a small subset of the data in
this paper - and did not attempt to categorize the products for
sale. Additionally, there is a complementary lines of work on
malicious hacking forums (i.e. [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11],
[12]) - which is a related but different topic from this paper.
II. MALICIOUS HACKING PRODUCT CATEGORIZATION
In this section, we describe our malicious hacker product
dataset and our use of clustering to identify malicious hacker
product categories. We examined 17 malicious hacker market-
places crawled over a 6 month period. The crawled information
was then parsed and stored in a relational database. Relevant
tables record the marketplaces themselves, the vendors of the
various products and the items/products for sale. Each item
is associated with a vendor and a marketplace, allowing for
join queries. Some of the more relevant fields for marketplace
items include the price, title, description, rating, posting date.
In this work, we primarily extract features from the product
title/name to generate features.
We note that many items are cross-posted and are nearly
identical. We show the distribution of vendors who use the
same screen-name across multiple marketplaces in Fig. 1(a).
To clean our product data, we identify duplicate (cross-posted)
products and report on the size of our dataset in Table I.
As we collect data from a variety of different sites, there is
inconsistency as to how products are categorized on each site
- if such non-trivial categorization even exists for a given site.
In addition, there is a clear absence of a standardized method
for vendors to register their products. As a consequence, the
great majority of products are unique when compared with
simple matching or regular expression technique. It is valid
even in the case where a pair of vendors with different screen
names post what a human would determine to be the same
product. Fig. 1(b) shows the distribution of products and
number of vendors sharing each product. The distribution
follows a power-law. Note that about 57% of products are
unique by simple comparison methods.
Clustering approach. Using product names, we engineer
features that represent each product as a vector. A set of
pilot experiments suggests that word and character n-grams
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TABLE I
SCRAPED DATA FROM MARKETPLACES IN DARKWEB.
Marketplaces 17
Products (Total) 16122
Products (Distinct) 9093
Vendors 1332
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Fig. 1. Distribution of (a) Shared Vendors over Markets. (b) Products over
Shared Vendors.
would provide more pure clusters compared with other feature
engineering methods, such as meta-data or domain-specific
keywords. These features were valued using standard term
frequency - inverse document frequency (TF-IDF), after the
elimination of stopping words and the execution of steaming.
We evaluated word n-gram feature vectors of length up to 1
and up to 2 words and many character n-gram features in the
ranges from 3 to 7 and from 4 to 7. This gave us 10 different
feature vectors in all. To verify which of these strategies could
reach the best performance in our dataset, we evaluated the
effect of the different types of feature vectors on the accuracy
and purity of clusters produced by the K-means algorithm.
To determine the best feature vector, we manually labeled
500 samples using 34 labeled groups (listed in Table III). We
used 400 of the samples to determine centroids for each of
the 34 groups, and then we evaluated the resulting clustering
on the remaining 100 samples. We examined the accuracy
of the different approaches when compared to ground truth
using the Rand-index method [13]. This method is defined as
the number of pairs correctly considered in the same class or
correctly considered in different classes divided by
(
n
2
)
, where
n is the number of samples. In addition, we used standard
entropy measurements to examine the purity of the clusters.
Entropy measures the amount of disorder in a cluster. A zero-
value for this metric means the clusters are formed by just one
class. The formal definition is as follows:
entropy(Di) = −
k∑
i=1
Pri(cj) log2 Pri(cj), (1)
where Pri(cj) is the proportion of class cj data points in
cluster i or Di. The total entropy (considering all clusters) is:
entropytotal(D) =
k∑
i=1
|Di|
|D| x entropy(Di) (2)
Table II shows the performance of each TF-IDF vector-
ization using Rand-index and entropy, when K-means starts
with the 34 fixed centroids. For Rand-index, character n-
grams in the range from 3 to 4, 3 to 5, and 3 to 6, when K-
means used cosine similarity reached a high best performance
(0.986). In addition, we also found the best entropy (0.067)
when K-means uses the same specification. This way, K-means
configuration with character n-grams in the range from 3 to
6 for vectorization, cosine similarity for distance function and
the 34 points for the starting centroids was our natural choice
to produce the clusters in the entire dataset.
We also examined the performance of our approach using
random centroids. As expected, it performs worse than using
the centroids derived from products. Additionally, we exam-
ined products (from the full dataset) with a cosine similarity
of less than 0.1 from the calculated centroids. There were 410
such distinct products (4.51% of the dataset). These were then
manually examined and most were found to be irrelevant to
our target domain - and we did not consider them further.
III. ANALYST INTERPRETATION OF PRODUCT CLUSTERS
In this section, we examine the results of clustering based
on character n-grams in the range 3 to 6 using initial centroids
determined from the labeled data. In order to analyze the
information of these clusters, we calculated their entropy with
respect to two different criteria: marketplaces and vendors.
We also checked in the database the number of distinct
marketplaces and vendors inside each cluster. The idea was
to understand the diversity of the clusters regarding these
two facets. A low marketplace entropy for a given cluster
would mean its products were mainly found in a particular
marketplace. Similarly, low vendor entropy would mean the
cluster’s products were mainly sold by a particular vendor.
Table III presents the results.
As shown in Table III, Links holds the lowest entropy when
we analyzed the marketplaces, suggesting the great majority
of products come from the same market. In this cluster, 80%
of products came from only 2 markets. However, when we
check the vendor entropy for this same cluster, we can observe
a higher value, suggesting that many vendors are actually
offering products related to Links. It is possible that many
markets discourage the re-selling of lists of links, as much of
this information can be found on darkweb Wiki’s for free.
Similarly, Hacking Tools holds the lowest entropy for the
vendor criteria. This suggest that only a few vendors are
present in that cluster. Specifically, only 2 vendors author
416(50%) of this type of products. At first glance, this may be
surprising as this appears to be a very general group. However,
upon inspection of the contents, we find that many authors of
these products are actually organizations. These organizations
use similar language in their product description in an effort to
brand their wares. This could indicate the presence of hacking-
collectives that author products as well as the limitations of our
text-based approach - which can potentially cluster products
branded in a similar fashion. We also note one of the most
TABLE II
K-MEANS EVALUATION (FIXED CENTROIDS).
Rand-index
word(1,1) word(1,2) char(3,4) char(3,5) char(3,6) char(3,7) char(4,4) char(4,5) char(4,6) char(4,7) Random
Cosine 0.986 0.985 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.984 0.982 0.933
Euclidean 0.986 0.977 0.976 0.973 0.973 0.974 0.975 0.975 0.977 0.971 0.933
Entropy
Cosine 0.075 0.079 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.075 0.072 0.079 0.088 0.088 0.423
Euclidean 0.224 0.110 0.153 0.156 0.156 0.141 0.134 0.134 0.137 0.175 0.423
TABLE III
CLUSTERS ENTROPY.
No of No of Market No of Vendor
Rank Cluster Name Products Markets Entropy Vendors Entropy
1 Carding 1263 16 0.320 315 0.720
2 PayPal-related 1103 16 0.340 335 0.754
3 Cashing Credit Cards 867 16 0.351 256 0.738
4 PGP 865 15 0.347 203 0.696
5 Netflix-related 846 14 0.270 351 0.805
6 Hacking Tools - General 825 15 0.331 132 0.516
7 Dumps - General 749 12 0.289 280 0.777
8 Linux-related 561 16 0.372 117 0.758
9 Email Hacking Tools 547 13 0.335 196 0.738
10 Network Security Tools 539 15 0.366 117 0.621
11 Ebay-related 472 15 0.385 163 0.772
12 Amazon-related 456 16 0.391 197 0.825
13 Bitcoin 443 15 0.360 201 0.823
14 Links (Lists) 422 12 0.211 221 0.838
15 Banking 384 13 0.349 186 0.840
16 Point of Sale 375 15 0.384 181 0.841
17 VPN 272 12 0.413 130 0.827
18 Botnet 257 12 0.291 110 0.796
19 Hacking Groups Invitation 251 14 0.387 143 0.865
20 RATs 249 15 0.453 99 0.797
21 Browser-related 249 12 0.380 134 0.857
22 Physical Layer Hacking 237 13 0.408 122 0.856
23 Password Cracking 230 13 0.434 100 0.781
24 Smartphone - General 223 14 0.408 110 0.816
25 Wireless Hacking 222 13 0.389 56 0.601
26 Phishing 218 13 0.403 111 0.849
27 Exploit Kits 218 14 0.413 91 0.795
28 Viruses/Counter AntiVirus 210 14 0.413 60 0.684
29 Network Layer Hacking 205 14 0.459 60 0.716
30 RDP Servers 191 12 0.405 124 0.895
31 Android-related 156 11 0.429 60 0.770
32 Keyloggers 143 13 0.496 77 0.862
33 Windows-related 119 12 0.464 50 0.717
34 Facebook-related 119 15 0.501 67 0.876
prominent vendor in this cluster was itself a marketplace -
which is also reflected in the low marketplace entropy.
In our analysis of the Facebook and Keylogger clusters, we
can see that they point to the other direction. They have high
values for both entropy, a clear sign about the diversity with
respect to both vendors and markets. For example, in cluster
Facebook, there were 119 products and 67 vendors, and the
most prolific vendor for this cluster authored only 8 products.
In the same cluster, products were also spread across 15
markets - and the most well-represented market was associated
with 30 products. This analysis also indicates widespread
prevalence of keyloggers - which is not surprising as it is
a well established hacking technique. However, observing the
similar trend for the Facebook cluster could be indicative of
an increase in demand for Facebook-directed social media
hacking products and information.
Conclusion and Future Work. In this paper, we conducted
an initial examination of malware products from 17 mali-
cious hacker markets through unsupervised learning. Using
manually-labeled data, we studied the effect of feature vector
on cluster purity using text-based features. We then analyzed
the impurity of clusters in our corpus of over 8, 000 malicious
hacking products with respect to vendor and marketplace, and
finally, we identified several interesting characteristics of how
the products were grouped. Currently, we are examining other
methods for grouping these products using matrix factorization
and supervised techniques. Additionally, we are studying the
underlying social network of vendors through relationships
based on similar product offerings.
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